

Cooperation and Conflict

<http://cac.sagepub.com>

Republican Realism: Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective

Henrikki Heikka

Cooperation and Conflict 2005; 40; 91

DOI: 10.1177/0010836705049736

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/40/1/91>

Published by:

 SAGE Publications

<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:

Nordic International Studies Association

Additional services and information for *Cooperation and Conflict* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://cac.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Republican Realism

Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective

HENRIKKI HEIKKA

ABSTRACT

Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy has usually been approached as a change from a policy of cautious neutrality to one of enthusiastic integration within the core of Europe. This article suggests that instead of looking at Finnish post-Cold War grand strategy as evidence of a change, we could think about it as a sign of continuity. By tracing the evolution of Finnish strategic culture over the centuries, the article shows that there is a powerful element of continuity in Finnish strategic thinking. This continuity is interpreted through a revised version of Martin Wight's vocabulary, and suggests that Finnish strategic culture has always been based on a republican understanding of Finland's role in defending an anti-hegemonic security order in Europe.

Keywords: Finnish defence policy; republicanism; strategic culture

'Return to Europe': the Puzzle

Finnish grand strategy since the end of the Cold War poses an interesting challenge for strategic culture theorists. For half a decade, the country was regarded as the textbook case of pragmatic, low profile *realpolitik* which sought to minimize the influence of great powers in the Nordic region. Yet, once the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland abandoned its neutrality and isolationism almost overnight to carve for itself a role in the 'core' of Europe. At the same time, Finland began deepening its defence cooperation with NATO via a rapid and extensive PARP programme and later with active participation in crisis management in the Balkans and elsewhere.

While a change in the governing coalition in Finland in March 2003 and developments in Europe have led to minor changes in the nuances of Finnish grand strategy, Finland has remained faithful to the gospel of a strong Europe and a close transatlantic relationship. Thus, far from having sought to minimize great power influence in the region, post-Cold War Finland has followed a policy of engaging the two main Western power centres, the European Union and the US, and of binding them into the Nordic-Baltic region. How can we explain the change in Finnish grand



strategy in the post-Cold War years? Did Finnish strategic culture change overnight, and, if so, why?

The Argument in Short

In this article, I propose a historically grounded explanation for this puzzle. Briefly, I argue that Finland's return to Europe during the 1990s was not a change in Finnish strategic culture, but a reflection of continuity in Finns' centuries-long commitment to a republican strategic culture, based on the principle of non-domination and manifested throughout centuries in the defence of an anti-hegemonic political order in Europe.

Building on the common theory chapter, I first outline a conceptual model for evaluating strategic cultures. I then trace the evolution of Finnish strategic culture as it developed from its earliest stages, when it was still part of Swedish–Finnish strategic culture, to its more independent manifestations in the Finnish Grand Duchy and independent Finland. I show how the experience of being a neighbour to Russia, which never accepted republican ideals nor behaved according to the norms of Europe's anti-hegemonic constitutions, has led to a strong element of continuity in Finnish strategic culture, even if the actual strategies chosen varied depending on the circumstances.

I conclude that the change from neutrality to Europeanization, which has troubled many researchers and commentators, was not, therefore, a qualitative change from the perspective of strategic culture. I suggest that instead of explaining post-Cold War Finnish policy as evidence of a change in Finnish strategic culture, we should think of it as a sign of continuity.

Finnish Strategic Culture: The Mainstream Interpretation

Judging by the existing literature, Finland can be regarded as a 'hard case' — indeed, almost a desperate case — for strategic culture theory. Previous major works on Finnish strategic culture and grand strategy, as well as much of the international commentary on Finnish foreign policy, imply that there is little 'cultural' in Finnish strategic culture. On the contrary, the mainstream interpretation implies that Finnish strategic culture distilled the wisdom of cool *realpolitik*, in particular the idea that in Finland's geostrategic location, security considerations always trump value-based considerations (Ries, 1988, 1990; Visuri, 1989, 1990, 1997; Penttilä, 1991, 1994)

The mainstream has its roots in Finland's Cold War security dilemma. The goal of Finnish grand strategy, according to the mainstream, was to maintain a credible independent defence capability in order to minimize the interest of both the Soviets and NATO regarding Finnish territory. According to the advocates of the view, the practices making this possible were a military doctrine of conventional deterrence relying on a large, well-motivated reserve combined with pragmatic diplomacy seeking to maintain stability in East–West relations.

The theoretical backing for the mainstream was provided by the Nordic balance theory, which gave the international system and balance of power theory pride of place, while downplaying the role of international society. According to the Nordic balance theory, stability in the Nordic region rested on Norway and Denmark's qualified NATO membership, 'balanced' by Finland's FCMA treaty with the Soviet Union, with neutral Sweden in between (Brundtland, 1966). While none of the Finnish authors cited above accepted as such the role ascribed for Finland by the Nordic balance theory — all three essentially attempted to squeeze Finland into the same role as Sweden — they seemed to accept the balance of power logic behind the theory.

While I do not want to quarrel with the empirical evidence amassed by the proponents of the mainstream interpretation — although some updates about recent research findings will be provided in the following — I would like to suggest that the mainstream's difficulties in understanding Finnish grand strategy and strategic practice arise from the mainstream's rather shallow historical focus and inability to locate the evolution of Finnish strategic culture in the *longue durée* of European international society, a problem, I claim, that can be found from the logic behind the Nordic balance theory as well. Before making the case for my argument, let me first summarize the evidence on how Finnish grand strategy and strategic practices changed in the post-Cold War years.

Return to Europe: Grand Strategy

In the introductory article we defined grand strategy as a precondition for strategic practices. This implies that grand strategy incorporates an understanding of a country's desired place in international society as well as some idea about the means required to fulfil those desires. From this perspective, Finnish grand strategy in the post-Cold War years can be said to have three components: First, full integration of Finland into the 'core' of Europe to facilitate an active role in shaping Europe's grand strategy. Second, binding Russia more deeply into international society, in particular through the use of the EU's instruments. Third, maintaining a credible independent defence capability and developing interoperability with NATO.¹

The most authoritative articulations of Finnish post-Cold War grand strategy are the government's Reports on Finnish Security Policy from 1995, 1997 and 2001.² There are several noteworthy characteristics in these reports. First, even if foreign policy changed from neutrality to Europeanism, there is an emphasis of continuity in Finnish defence policy. Both the threat perceptions as well as the stated means for dealing with them reflect an evolution, rather than a revolution, when compared to Cold War grand strategy.

The 1995 report defines Finnish security policy as 'resting on the lessons of history and geopolitics' with the core lesson being, according to the report, that 'throughout its history, Finland has never enjoyed a protected security status'. The report identifies two major trends that could help in

preventing the return of the past. First, there is Finnish EU membership: 'membership in the European Union has clarified and strengthened Finland's status by including it in the core grouping of European democracies'. The second is Russia's democratization and the binding of Russia into 'Europe's common values and institutions'.

The report identifies three 'layers' of Finnish grand strategy. The outmost layer is 'stability policy', pursued, according to the report, primarily through the EU's CFSP. The second layer is 'conflict management', which refers to participation in international crisis management operations. The third is 'national defence', resting on territorial defence and conscription.

The subsequent reports can be seen as updates for the 1995 report, with the main difference being an evolution of the stated threat perceptions. The threat perceptions in the 1997 report included 'political or military pressure, implying the threat or limited use of military power'; 'a strategic strike aiming to paralyse vital strategic targets and to subjugate the national leadership'; 'a large-scale offensive, aiming at seizing strategically important areas or making use of Finnish territory for action against a third party'. To these three threat perceptions, the 2001 report added the possibility of 'regional instability'. The most recent report, published on 24 September 2004, added the threat of 'asymmetric warfare against the society' (i.e. terrorism), as well as included a reference to readiness to provide support, including military support, for other EU member states as required by the EU's solidarity clause.

In sum, the main documents on Finnish grand strategy since the end of the Cold War reflect a consistent Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy, while retaining homeland defence, the hard core of self-government, in Finnish hands.

Return to Europe: Strategic Practice

The guiding idea of the Finnish strategic practice throughout the post-Cold War years remained the doctrine of deterrence via a territorial defence system resting on a large reserve. Changes in these practices, such as trimming the Cold War era decentralized command and control system and cutting the number of war-time troops were evolutionary, not revolutionary.³

The basic dilemma of Finnish strategic planners in the post-Cold War years remained proximity to Russia, which maintained, by Finnish standards, a relatively large military potential in the areas adjacent to Finland. This dilemma put a straitjacket on Finnish strategic practices compared to the situation in the other Nordic countries.⁴

Finnish defence procurement in the 1990s focused on adding to the conventional deterrence system the capability actually to defend the country's airspace and territorial waters against a large-scale threat, including the capability of maintaining air superiority above crucial strategic targets and to have capabilities to react rapidly to major crises. Key purchases were 63 F/A-18 interceptors, the creation of three Readiness Brigades for the ground forces, and modernization of the Navy.⁵

Future procurement is likely to continue along these lines. A recent major study by the Defence Forces, published in March 2004, recommends three major weapons systems for increasing the capabilities of the ground forces: air to ground missiles and glide weapons for the F-18's, heavy rocket launchers, special munitions for the artillery, and the appropriate C3I systems for these systems.⁶

In the future, Finnish procurement and doctrine are likely also to be influenced by the ongoing RMA, in particular the advent of network-centric defence. Finland as a frontrunner in network-centric warfare might not seem that obvious, and the occasionally somewhat grandiose use of the concept to describe Finland's current capabilities has rightly been criticized by international commentators.⁷ Yet, there are areas of emphasis, where security applications of Finnish civilian technology into the military realm already seem promising.⁸ The strength of these sectors is that they are essentially applications of products of the Finnish civilian IT sector, which is relatively large, well-funded and well-manned by international standards. They also parallel closely what the EU has recently defined as the critical technologies Europe needs if it is to realize its ambitions of being a credible actor in security politics.⁹

Resuscitating the English Patient: Martin Wight Meets Strategic Culture Theory

To determine whether the change outlined above constitutes a change in strategic culture requires some clarification as to how to distinguish between different strategic cultures. As defined in the introductory chapter, we have decided to approach strategic culture as transnationally nested dynamic interplay between grand strategic discourse and strategic practices. However, to carve out any persistent, causally relevant, impact of strategic culture, it might be useful to devise a model that provides a zero-hypothesis of what strategic choices without a distinctly cultural input would have looked like in any given situation. Likewise, it would be helpful if we were able to distinguish between revisionist actors — actors that seek to undermine international society — from other actors, since responding to the former often requires different strategies from the defender, even if the preconditions for grand strategic reasoning on the part of the defender were to be the same.

Culture, of course, can never be totally isolated from aspects of material reality, such as geography and technological developments. Any attempt at causal explanation that presumes a clear line between the material and the social quickly runs into complicated theoretical, epistemological and ontological questions, only some of which have been briefly hinted at in the introductory article. However, if we set policy-relevant middle-range theorizing as our goal — something which seems to have been the intention of Nordic balance theorists as well as the above-mentioned mainstream works on Finnish strategic culture — it might be possible to use strategic cultures as ideal types of grand strategy and strategic practice.

A particularly useful distinction could be the English School's distinction between 'the three R's' — realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Martin Wight's original formulation of these concepts described them as three 'traditions', ways of thinking about how states relate to the idea of international society (Wight, 1991). The English School has tended to regard the three R's as things that exist in the minds of scholars rather than in the minds of statesmen. There is, however, no particular reason why we could not follow Wight in his occasional use of the three R's in referring to ideas guiding policy, i.e. preconditions for grand strategy in the minds of statesmen.

Continuing along these lines, a realist strategic culture could be defined as one where states construct their grand strategies and strategic practices in relation to power alone, with a view to balancing power as such, no matter what the identity of the power.¹⁰ The Nordic balance theory can be regarded as an example of realist theory applied to the Nordic region, and its logic is extendable, with some qualifications, into earlier phases of history as well.

Rationalist grand strategies and strategic practices have often been associated by the English School with the aim of strengthening the societal dimension of the international system. However, as Edward Keene, among others, has shown, the English School's use of rationalism has often been counter-Republican, originating in conservative German scholarship seeking to legitimize the post-Napoleonic order in Europe (Keene, 2002). One can see a corrective movement emerging, with republican security theory rising to challenge the conservative versions of rationalism within the English School. This article can be seen as a contribution to the wave of republican security thinking.¹¹

A properly constituted republican security architecture can be seen as constitutive of the state of non-domination at the level of international society.¹² When seeking to uncover republican strategic cultures one is thus looking for grand strategies and strategic practices that promote an international order based on the idea of non-domination. Such a republican security order in Europe has historically been maintained by constitutional settlements, power balances, a mixture of military instruments (such as land and sea power), and the territorial dispersion of power via the borders of sovereign states. If republicans are right in their arguments about a 'natural republic of Europe', then there ought also to be a rough 'natural security order' for Northern Europe, an order which arises from the region's place in Europe's security architecture and serves to defend the freedom of the people in Northern Europe.¹³

As an ideal type of rational strategic culture for the case under examination in this article, one could assume a republican model, where the 'constitution' of European international society, the *grande république*, is taken to be the anti-hegemonic peace settlements of Europe (Augsburg, Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, the European integration process and the system of US security guarantees which served to preserve the European republic under the Soviet threat) all of which sought to preserve European international society through the dispersion of power as well as a mixture of military

instruments arising from geopolitical considerations and materializing in anti-hegemonic strategic cultures.

Republican strategic cultures can thus be defined as cultures that have taken the defence of this order (and improvement of it in the spirit of non-domination) as a precondition of grand strategy. An ideal type of rationalist strategic culture would thus be one in which the grand strategic discourse were to involve constant references to the constitutional settlements of Europe, principles of non-domination, and where the practices would be tailored to signal restraint and moderation with respect to other states accepting these ideas and resolve towards states bent on hegemonic policies.

Defining revolutionary/revisionist strategic cultures is an even more slippery task. Wight himself agonized about which states to classify as revolutionary, but did refer to the role of the Catholic Church during the medieval *Respublica Christiana* as ‘the ancestor of modern revolutionism’ and to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as ‘revolutionist’ states (Wight, 1991: 8–12, 114–19). Following Wight’s footsteps, one could define as an ideal type of revolutionist strategic culture one rejecting the republican ‘constitutions’ of Europe and aiming at the creation of an alternative, usually hegemonic, society in Europe.

The Republican Legacy in Swedish–Finnish Strategic Culture

When seeking to explain changes in Finland’s security policy during the post-Cold War years, commentators have tended to focus on the shift from low-profile neutrality to active participation in the EU (Tiilikainen, 1998, 2003).¹⁴ In the following, I try to show that this research puzzle is historically misleading. By taking a step ‘upwards’ towards the more abstract topic of Finnish grand strategy in relation to the idea of Europe as a Republic, and an occasional look ‘downwards’ at Finnish strategic practices, I try to show that a long continuity exists in Finnish strategic culture, which helps to explain post-Cold War Finnish grand strategy as a sign of continuity rather than change.

From the English School’s perspective, the key to Finnish strategic culture lies in Western European strategic and political culture, which, up to the Reformation, was intertwined with Catholic religious authority. Catholicism was the spiritual glue that held the overlapping authorities of *Respublica Christiana* together. The grand strategic significance of Finland emerged initially as its role as the outpost of Roman-Catholic realm, which in turn laid the foundation for many of the later East–West divisions along Finland’s Eastern border.

Finland’s location at the intersection of two international societies, the Catholic realm and what later became the Byzantine commonwealth, became one of grand strategic significance when the Byzantine *Oikuméne*, essentially a fledgling empire under Kievan *Rus*, was replaced by Muscovy’s hegemony, which united Byzantine messianism with practices of governance inherited from Mongolian rule. Containing such a revisionist actor

required a balancing coalition, which the Kalmar Union — the first and last example of a real Nordic defence union — temporarily provided. However, in 1495, when Copenhagen made the first of its many strategic alliances with Russia at the same time as Russia made its first full-scale attempt to invade Finland, Sweden–Finland had to embark on a process of strategic innovation that eventually led to regional hegemony (*dominium maris Baltici*).¹⁵

As Russia's next major thrust against the West came in the mid-sixteenth century under Ivan the Terrible's leadership, Sweden–Finland was drawn into protecting not only Fenno-Scandia but also the Northern parts of the Baltic rimland. This made the Kingdom a power-broker in the larger scheme of things and necessitated an evolution in strategic culture. From the English School's perspective, integration of Swedish–Finnish grand strategy into European international society meant that practices that had previously acquired their meaning in relation to the struggle for mastery in Norden were now formulated in relation to Europe's security order, which, from the 1555 Peace of Augsburg onwards, had an anti-hegemonic constitution.¹⁶ In the Augsburg system, Sweden–Finland committed itself to an anti-hegemonic and constitutional order in Europe, even when competing simultaneously with regional powers over hegemony in the Baltic Sea.

Defending the constitutional order of Europe went hand in hand with strategic practices, which left their mark on Finland. The administrative and military reforms conducted under Gustavus Adolphus, in particular the creation of a 'national' army based on conscription, incorporated Finns tightly into the Swedish–Finnish body politic. For ordinary Finns, the first real experience of republicanism came in service of the Army that in the Thirty Years' War brought the forces of counter-reformation to their knees, thus paving the way for the first real constitution of the Republic of Europe, Westphalia.¹⁷

At the level of grand strategy, the novel component in Swedish–Finnish grand strategy during the time was an early recognition of the gradual strategic fusion of the southern system of states (which can also be called the Latin or Western system of states) with the North-Eastern system of states.¹⁸ The settlements that emerged out of the fusion, Westphalia and later Utrecht, owed much to theorists of natural law, such as Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius, who both worked for Sweden–Finland (Pufendorf taught at the University of Lund and worked as an adviser to the King, whereas Grotius was the country's ambassador in Paris in the 1630s).¹⁹ The grand strategy of Sweden–Finland at the time — though in some ways offensive and expansionist — can thus be seen in relation to the constraints and opportunities that arose from the merging of two regional state systems into one pan-European one, and that were informed by a republican conception of the desirable architecture for this fusion.

The emergence of a more distinct Finnish strategic culture arose when the rise of Russia under the leadership of Peter the Great challenged Stockholm's ability to maintain a state of non-domination in Fenno-Scandia. While the Finns experienced the full force of Petrine Russia in the Great Northern War and began to think of the country's role in the

Republic of Europe through another paradigm than regional hegemony, Stockholm sought to turn the tables on Russia in two pre-emptive wars against Russia in the eighteenth century, both unpopular among ordinary Finns.²⁰

The Finnish experience of Stockholm's stubborn unwillingness to accept the state of imperial overstretch during the eighteenth century gave birth to two components of Finnish strategic culture which were later to play a major role: first, a commitment to strategic restraint and the importance of alliances to balance Russia, personified initially by Arvid Horn; second, to free trade and political liberalism, personified by Anders Chydenius.²¹

Horn was the symbol of strategic moderation in early eighteenth-century Swedish–Finnish strategic culture. A native Finn, who after a career as an officer and diplomat became one of the most prominent politicians in Sweden–Finland, he was the main opponent of Charles XII's expansionist policies during the Great Northern War.²² Horn has been credited for Sweden's brief alliance with Britain and France in the late 1720s, as well as for combining the alliance agreement with France with a friendship treaty with Russia in 1735, which allowed a weakened Sweden–Finland to balance against a rising Russia in a defensive way. Horn's main power-base (the so-called cap party) in parliament consisted mainly of clergy and peasants as well as people residing in Finland, excluding nobility, whereas his opponents, the 'hats', consisted mostly of military officers, businessmen and civil servants.

Horn's policies had their weaknesses. Appeasing Russia might have been a good short-term option if it had been coupled with reforming and strengthening the military as well as deepening the ties with the West, which did not happen during Horn's time. The significance of Horn's thinking arose from his sensitivity to the strategic realities that Finns faced under the shadow of an increasingly powerful Russia, and Horn's thinking about Swedish–Finnish grand strategy as an exercise of how to fit Russia within the Republic of Europe can be seen as an early version of later Finnish grand strategy.²³

Finnish concerns at the time also led to the rise of political and economic liberalism, culminating in the work of Anders Chydenius, often referred to as one of the first thinkers in the world to publish a theory of free trade and to articulate it in parliament (Chydenius, 1765). While Chydenius's primary worry was about the way in which business lobbies in Stockholm used state power to make Finnish products less competitive, mainly tar and naval goods, the significance of his work lay in articulating a body of liberal political theory and in creating a direct bridge between Finland and European markets as cities in Western Finland acquired free trading rights.²⁴

The evolution of a distinctly liberal Finnish strategic culture was interrupted violently when the balance of power in the Republic of Europe was disturbed in the late eighteenth century by Napoleon's bid for hegemony, which eventually led to a deal about spheres of interest between France and Russia. The unpredictable course of events of the Napoleonic wars, essentially isolating the main balancer to Russian power, Britain, from the Baltic Sea, took a crucial component away from Swedish–Finnish grand strategy.²⁵

With Swedish troops tied elsewhere, Britain being excluded from the regional balance, and the Finnish southern coast falling under a major Russian offensive, Finland was effectively cut off from Sweden. As a result, and for the first time in history, Russia could essentially dictate Finland's place in the European security order.²⁶

'Independence Lite': Strategic Culture in the Finnish Grand Duchy

The cultural background for Finnish grand strategy and strategic practice during the century of Autonomy was the Vienna system. However, as the conservative and in many ways counter-republican nature of the Vienna system combined with Russia's gradually tightening grip on Finland during the nineteenth century, republicans and liberals in Finland recognized that they had to formulate a grand exit strategy from the Russian sphere of influence. The nineteenth century in Finnish strategic culture is thus a story of a nation awakening to realize that defending republicanism required distancing itself from the Russian empire, by force if necessary, and alone if needed. The two main schools of thought in Finnish grand strategy, Fennomans and liberals, differed not in their ultimate goal but in their assessment of how to achieve that goal.

The early decades of Finnish autonomy were characterized by a conscious project of building a national identity distinct from Sweden, with a surge of Finnish-language books and political newspapers being introduced in the 1820s and 1830s to compete with Swedish culture. Initially, the Russian government did not oppose Finnish nationalism, even though it was rather anti-Russian in its content, since it was seen as a useful counterweight to the prevailing Swedish influence in Finland.

The key political text in constructing the idea of a Finnish state separate from Russia and Sweden was a theory originally articulated by Israel Hwasser, dressed up in legal form by Adolf Iwar Arwidsson and Jacob Tengström, which gained general acceptance in the Finnish elite around the mid-nineteenth century. The 'doctrine of the state' developed by them was based on the contract theory of natural law, and it implied that the Porvoo Diet in 1809 had emancipated Finland from Sweden, thereby turning the country into a state governed by a constitution. According to this interpretation, Finland was an autonomous state in union with Russia, run according to a code of laws inherited from the time of Sweden–Finland. The text gained political relevance in 1862 when the committee making preparations for the Diet in Helsinki started referring to the concepts of 'fundamental law', 'constitution' and 'government powers' in reference to the Estates' relation to the Russian Tsar.²⁷

The strategic culture of Finland, characterized by the construction of a republican domestic order and national self-determination in reference to the body of norms and rules of international law, emerged in two forms. Later historians have referred to these as 'Fennomans' and 'liberals'; the former implying a more conciliatory approach to Russia, the latter associated

with a tougher line. However, such distinctions tend to blur the fact that both traditions were based on the principles of republicanism, and that the choice of which school had the upper hand at any given time can be explained rather well by reference to changing Russian policy and the balance of power in Europe. Indeed, the trajectory of Finnish grand strategy from the more Fennoman 'separatist loyalism' through the more liberal 'constitutionalist opposition' to full-scale use of force in 1918 can be interpreted as a reaction to Russia's gradual distancing from the principles of the Vienna system and, thus, the Republic of Europe.²⁸

The above-mentioned mainstream 'doctrine of state' was initially formulated to a new level, seeking to construct Finland as an actor in international relations rather than as an autonomous Grand Duchy, in the wake of the Polish uprising when the liberal newspaper *Helsingfors Dagblad* suggested that Finland's policy in the case of war between Russia and the West should be one of neutrality. The newspaper proposed that King Karl XV of Sweden should attempt to gain international recognition for Finnish neutrality through an international agreement similar to the one on which Belgian and Swiss neutrality was based (see Penttilä, 1994: 8–9). This position received support in Stockholm from a group of Finnish emigrants who had kept alive the issue of separating Finland from the Russian empire and of reuniting it with Sweden.

The most prominent opponent of aspirations for full independence, neutrality or a new union of Nordic countries, was Johan Vilhelm Snellman, who declared them unrealistic at the time. Snellman warned that Finnish separatism would only lead to violence between Russia and Finland, with the smaller actor at the receiving end. Snellman was also a Hegelian Fennoman who believed that nation-states should be based on homogeneous linguistic and ideological foundations, which he believed in the Finnish case to be the Finnish language and a Fennoman ideology, not the Swedish language and Scandinavianist ideology. While Snellman's views on language were not liberal, his thinking on other subjects, such as academic freedom, were, and his political views can well be described as republican.

Snellman's policy, referred to as 'separatist loyalism' by later historians, gained popularity in the political elite to the extent that it can be described as representative of Finnish strategic culture. However, the reason for adopting the policy was related less to conclusions concerning the debate between the liberals and the Fennomans than to conclusions relating to what was realistically possible to achieve.²⁹

Understanding separatist loyalism as a republican grand strategy requires taking into account the reality of Finland's military weakness at the time and the possibility of being dragged into a Russian–Western war because of that weakness. The Crimean war had taught the Finnish leadership the lesson that Finland could become a theatre of war in conflicts between Russia and European maritime powers — a particularly problematic scenario because of Finland's dependence on Western export markets.³⁰ The aim of Finnish policy at the time was to assure the Russians that Finland would not slide to the Western camp to the extent that Finnish territory could be used as a logistical springboard for operations against

Russia. At an abstract level, the grand strategy of separatist loyalism contained aspects similar to the neutrality of the other Nordic countries at the time; it implied restraint towards Russia, with at the same time an implicit reliance on the Western (i.e. Royal Navy) presence in the region to limit the extent of Russian influence.

However, as the Russian empire began to consolidate in the late nineteenth century and as Russian military inferiority was revealed by the Crimean war, the strategic practices upholding Finland's place in Europe took on a more direct form. In particular, Finns began to realize that republicanism might have to be defended through arms if necessary and that opportunities for escaping from Russia's military sphere of influence were beginning to emerge.

The crucial steps were taken in 1904–05 as a result of five years of intensive 'Russification', which had included abolishing the autonomous Finnish army. The Finnish reaction included a general strike, murder of the Russian Governor-General and the setting up of local militias, the Civil Guards, to protect the population against Russian 'oppressive measures' as well as to balance emerging Red Guards inspired by socialism.³¹ The Finnish unicameral parliament, which was set up in 1906, strictly reflected the principles of Western liberalism — among other things, it was the first parliament in Europe to give women the right to vote — and managed to create a measure of political unity in Finland, while Russia drifted into militarism and domestic turmoil.

Stability in Finland came under threat in early 1918, when local communist activists teamed up with thousands of Russian troops (still based in several garrisons in the now independent Republic of Finland) in an attempt to overthrow the Finnish government. The rebellion brought with it the prospect of Finland being integrated within the Soviet sphere of influence. The Finnish Parliament thus decided to authorize the Civil Guards, led by General Gustav Mannerheim, to use force to defend the republic's constitution.

Mannerheim's chosen grand strategy, resolute use of force, reflected his political beliefs and the potentialities offered by Finnish strategic culture. Mannerheim was a patriot, a constitutionalist republican and an anti-communist, who early rejected the Fennomans' line of appeasement towards Russia as well as Fennoman views of a nation-state based on ethnic and linguistic kinship. Mannerheim also had a sceptical view of the liberals' illusions of Finland's place in international society. In Mannerheim's initial view, the vision of Finnish liberals could be realized only through the liberalization of Russia, which Mannerheim — socialized to the liberal and cosmopolitan elite of St. Petersburg during his years in Russia — seems to have viewed as a possible scenario at the time (Screen, 1970: 47–52). However, when the Bolsheviks emerged victorious in Russia, and Western help for imposing regime change in St. Petersburg proved inadequate (and unacceptable for Germany), Mannerheim focused his energies on sealing Finland off from the Soviet empire.

Mannerheim's leadership ensured that in 1918 Finland was the first country to be able to stop Bolshevism through active military means — some-

thing that Mannerheim already at the time regarded as an event of world-historical significance. The achievement drew a crucial distinction between Finland and most of the Zwischeneuropean zone, where it was effectively the German troops that liberated the countries from Russian occupation, and the Western victory over Germany that liberated the zone from the Germans.³² It is doubtful whether Finnish policy would have been what it was had it not been for the long continuity in republican security thinking and liberal values in Finnish strategic culture. In terms of strategic culture, Finland's solo exit from the Russian sphere of influence was also a grand exit from the Vienna system of collective hegemony, which had failed to deliver the fundamental republican right of self-government for small countries.

Stalin or Hitler? Finnish Strategic Culture Between Two Revolutionaries

From the perspective of Finnish strategic culture, the Soviet era can meaningfully be described as one long episode, essentially a long war of defending republicanism against a revolutionist empire next door. Finland's survival required three full-scale wars (1918, 1939–40, 1941–44) and half a century of active opposition to Soviet attempts to interfere in the political life of the republic.³³

At an abstract level, Finnish grand strategy throughout this period had two main components, external balancing and internal balancing, both aimed at maintaining a state of non-domination in the region.³⁴ External balancing involved the construction of alliance relationships aimed at containing Soviet influence. Internal balancing implied the mobilization of domestic capabilities to raise the cost of use of military force by the Soviets against Finland as high as possible. At the risk of simplification, it could be said that external balancing was the dominant strategy in the inter-war years, while during the Cold War the emphasis was on internal balancing because the preponderance of Soviet power excluded the option of direct reliance on Western allies.

The main innovation in Finnish strategic practices developed in the 1926 so-called Defence Revision was to consider the permanent standing forces of the Army simply as a training organization acting to protect and facilitate the rapid mobilization of large reserves. The fighting doctrine of the troops was a territorial defence doctrine, which implied the use of mixed, locally based, troop formations operating under flexible and decentralized command, and trained to fight in specific regions.³⁵ Essentially, this solution laid the foundation for strategic practices that have endured until today.

During the inter-war years, the Finnish attempt to find allies to balance Soviet power included attempts to engage Britain and France (1919–21) in the security politics of the region, flirting with the idea of building a coalition of states from the Baltic rimland (early 1920s) and a more serious attempt at Nordic military cooperation (1930s). In the 1920s and 1930s Finland also supported a tight sanctions system against aggressors in the

League of Nations. In World War II, when requests for help from the US, Britain and France came to nothing, Finland temporarily relied on co-belligerency with Germany.³⁶

From the perspective of grand strategy and Nordic strategic culture, the most interesting balancing attempt was the Nordic option, since it was both the most natural choice in terms of political values as well as the one in which most effort was invested.³⁷ Initially, Nordic cooperation in security policy increased steadily throughout the 1930s. In 1934, Mannerheim argued that Finnish security should be seen as part of a comprehensive vision of Nordic security, and called for all Nordic countries to strengthen their defences.³⁸ Replacing collective security by a more clearly Nordic orientation became official policy in 1935, when prime minister Kivimäki declared Finland's aim as 'establishing cooperation between Finland and the Scandinavian countries in order to secure common Nordic neutrality'.³⁹

The arrival and rise of Nazi Germany on the scene of European politics meant that the Nordic option became very difficult to pursue in practice. As both Hitler and Stalin accelerated their military build-up of offensive forces, Fenno-Scandia was left between two powerful revolutionaries clearly not interested in maintaining a republican security order in Europe. In the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, signed in August 1939, Eastern Europe was divided into two imperial zones, and the Soviet attempt to occupy Finland in late 1939 was a logical part of fulfilling the Soviet part of the plan.

As the rest of the Eastern European countries one by one began to fall under the Soviet and Nazi war machines, Finns managed to stop the Soviet offensive alone and to cause large-scale damage to the Red Army in 1939–40.⁴⁰ However, the Finnish assessment of the situation remained that Stalin was no republican, and that if a power vacuum were to emerge Stalin would seek to fulfil the hegemonic goals set out in the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.

The credibility of Britain and France (and, potentially, the US) in maintaining a balance with Soviet power in the Nordic region was diminished with Germany's rapid occupation of Denmark and Norway in spring 1940, which *de facto* isolated Fenno-Scandia from the Western Allies (unless Finland were to join the Western Allies in a war over Norway, which, unlikely though it was, worried the Germans). Likewise, a Swedish commitment to Finland was no more a realistic option either, since the prerequisite in previous times, i.e. a commitment by Britain or France, was no more possible.

Finland was thus left with accepting co-belligerency with Germany, or the option of having to face the Soviets alone — which the Finnish leadership thought it would not survive, especially with the defensive depth provided by the Karelian Isthmus lost to the Soviets. Mannerheim's leadership enabled Finland to negotiate an acceptable deal with the Germans for the defence of Northern Finland, enabling the concentration of Finnish troops in Karelia, where the massive battles of 1944 were fought. Mannerheim's authority and anglophile reputation was also essential after the war, when

Finland, having once again stopped a full-scale Russian invasion attempt, had to show its commitment to republicanism by driving the German forces out of Northern Finland through the use of force, and by recreating trust with the Western allies through diplomacy.⁴¹

The Cold War: Conventional Deterrence and Secret Cooperation with the US

From the perspective of strategic culture theory, the post-war situation returned Finland's dilemma to where it was prior to the emergence of Hitler's revolutionary–revisionist strategic culture in central Europe and the rapid militarization of Germany in the latter half of the 1930s. After the defeat of the Nazis, there was no longer a revolutionary threat to Finland's republican political culture from the West. However, the extent of Soviet power and the geopolitical reach of the Soviet empire in Europe after World War II made reliance on the West very difficult. Finland had to defend republicanism practically alone, almost a thousand kilometres East of the East–West front line in Central Europe, with Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities at least numerically exceeding those of Western Europe as a whole. The traditional solution of linking a major Western power via Sweden within Finnish security was therefore not available and would not have been credible in any case because of the supremacy of Soviet power.

Finnish strategic practices during the early decades of the Cold War did not rest on the logic of defence, which would have been too expensive (requiring almost two times higher defence budgets) but on the logic of deterrence — on dissuading the enemy from aggression by increasing its costs. In concrete terms, the system aimed at making the use of Finnish territory too costly to be used as a launching pad for offensive operations or their support operations against a third party (i.e. Sweden and NATO). The main tool of the Finnish military in containing the Soviet Union was a flexible and adaptable conventional deterrence doctrine.

During the first decade of the Cold War, the economic situation did not allow for major weapons procurement, and Finland had to rely on existing World War II stocks of weaponry, which allowed for 15 divisions of ground troops. The paradigm chosen was a territorial defence doctrine relying on conscription and large reserves. The military doctrine reflected the material realities of the Finnish defence forces at the time, with an emphasis on static defences, relatively low mobility and the use of territorial advantages for defence, as had been the case during the Winter War.

In the late 1950s, all aspects of 'total defence', including economic, academic, medical and psychological aspects, began to be planned and developed consciously through separate inter-agency committees. The 1960s was a period when the economic situation allowed the Finnish territorial defence system to be reformed to reflect the realities of the time, even though it took years until the system became fully operational. Several factors favoured a territorial defence system and reliance on large ground

forces. The system was non-offensive, hard to defeat with surprise strikes, relatively affordable, and fitted well with the official grand strategy of neutrality (Visuri, 1989: 29).

In 1966, the country was divided into seven military districts all capable of fighting independently in the event other parts of the country were destroyed or occupied. The system implied a widely dispersed territorial defence system with an emphasis on flexibility and the ability to concentrate forces in critical areas. The forces were divided into local troops and the main force, the former spread throughout the country with the job of slowing down the enemy, the latter, the more heavily armed main forces, used to engage the enemy in critical areas. In the 1960s, domestic production and procurement from abroad also allowed for reforms of the Air Force and the Navy through purchases of modern fighters, Navy vessels and coastal artillery. The development of tactics in this phase still largely followed the lessons of wartime experience, and emphasis was on total war and the use of defensive depth to thwart a large-scale offensive.⁴²

The period of decreasing East–West tension from the late 1960s onwards was characterized by domestic political consensus, materializing in three parliamentary defence committees (1970–71, 1975–77, 1980–81) allowing defence budgets to grow steadily by about 4 per cent per year until the late 1980s.⁴³ Doctrinal evolution in the 1970s reflected the continuing need to adapt to the Western flexible defence doctrine and Soviet tactical nuclear options, which were widened with the modernization of Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities at the time. The system emphasized the defence of cities in Southern Finland and of Lapland, which became more important as Soviet capabilities in the Kola peninsula grew.

The beginning of the ‘second Cold War’ moved the Finnish defence system even further towards crisis prevention, with an emphasis on developing capabilities for reacting rapidly to crises involving Finnish territory, airspace and territorial waters. The focus in threat perceptions expanded to include not only nuclear but also non-nuclear precision-guided strikes and special forces operations. Since the Air Force and the Navy were considered capable of their tasks, the emphasis on material acquisition was on improving the 250,000 strong readiness force, which was the main instrument through which the strategy of deterrence via territorial defence could be used as a tool for crisis management. The capability of defending key strategic targets, such as the capital, Lapland and the Åland islands was emphasized — even though credibility of the commitment in the case of the latter two might have been doubtful considering Soviet dominance at the time.⁴⁴

As suggested earlier, the mainstream interpretation given to these practices reflects the logic of the Nordic balance argument. According to this line of reasoning, Finland’s intention, just like that of the other Nordic countries, was to limit great power involvement in the region, thereby ensuring stability. An alternative interpretation, based on the argument presented in this article, suggests that Finnish strategic practices did not have as their aim the balancing of power as such, but instead of throwing Finland’s weight behind the coalition of Western powers seeking to contain

and eventually transform the Soviet Union, the revisionist power in the region. If the latter could be proved to be the case, then Finland's return to Europe in the 1990s would also be much easier to explain — it could simply be constructed as continuity in a republican strategic culture. The visible evidence of the 'return to Europe' might be explained simply by the increased freedom of manoeuvre that the collapse of Soviet power created for Finland's republican security policy.

Recent research findings suggest that the evidence in favour of the latter interpretation might be more persuasive. In particular, what is now known about the extent of Finnish military cooperation with the US for most of the Cold War, suggests that Finland did not seriously plan to defend its neutrality against the West and certainly did not adapt to Soviet policies to the extent implied by the concept of Finlandization.⁴⁵

According to present knowledge, secret Finnish–American military cooperation started in 1962 with the commander Sakari Simelius visiting the US, and began with transfers of signals intelligence equipment and knowhow from the US to Finland, as well as coordination of plans for US support for Finnish stay-behind activities in the event of crisis.⁴⁶ Cooperation expanded throughout the 1960s with top Finnish military intelligence officers engaging in electronic intelligence technology procurement activities and exchange of intelligence information with the US. Eventually, Finnish military intelligence provided the Americans with information about Finnish war plans, including detailed information about Finnish wartime deployment plans. As Finnish capabilities of monitoring Soviet underwater activities grew, Finland provided the US with hydrophone recordings of Soviet submarine activity in Finland's vicinity and the Americans helped Finland in constructing a library of recordings needed to monitor Soviet and Warsaw Pact submarines. The US also provided Finland with detailed information about Soviet military activities in the Leningrad military district and the Kola Peninsula, electronic intelligence equipment and early warning during periods of international tension. According to contemporary knowledge, all of this seems to have occurred without the explicit political approval of President Kekkonen in order to facilitate deniability in the case of being caught.⁴⁷

From the perspective of strategic culture as defined in the introductory chapter, these activities are fascinating. On the one hand they tell about military acting on its own, undermining the officially stated and democratically decided policy of neutrality. On the other hand, one could argue that they tell about a military establishment doing the right thing, defending the principle of non-domination at the time when the political leadership was unable to do so openly because of Finland's vulnerable geopolitical location and constant Soviet pressure.

What is also interesting from the law-and-order perspective of the English School was that the behaviour of the top military officials in this case was both illegal (the law forbids military officials from conducting the kind of activities they were engaged in without the approval of the President and Parliament, which they never got) and contrary to international law (after World War II, Finland had been forced to sign the FCMA treaty with the

Soviet Union, which explicitly banned Finland from military cooperation with West Germany or its allies). Unacceptable by conventional English School standards, inexplicable by Nordic balance theory, Finnish grand strategy can nevertheless be interpreted as virtuous from the republican point of view. Had Finland followed the policies dictated by the Soviets and the Allied Control Commission at the end of World War II, the country would essentially have been left to the Soviet sphere of influence.

One might, indeed should, debate whether the covert nature of the making of Finnish grand strategy was necessary and desirable (I would argue that at the time it was both, and that the alternative would have been far more dangerous). However, it is of little use to pretend that it did not happen, especially when the trend of military cooperation with almost any Western power to balance Russian power seems to have such long continuity in Finnish strategic culture.

Beyond the Nordic Balance: Is Finland the Truth about Scandinavia?

The Finnish case, contrasted with the other case studies, seems to suggest that there is something rather un-Scandinavian or un-Nordic in Finnish strategic culture. Indeed, if by *Norden* we are referring to a political community where foreign military involvement is minimized, where the military is strictly under political control and where military force is applied with caution, then Finland can hardly be called a Nordic country.

As far as Western cooperation is concerned, it is difficult to find a Western great power that Finland would not have engaged in military cooperation with during its independence. The limits to cooperation seem to have followed from the imperatives of secrecy and from divisions within the West (particularly between Germany and other European countries in the first half of the twentieth century) rather than from Finnish desires. While such practices were dangerous and destabilizing from the perspective of Nordic balance theory, the record of Finnish and Cold War history suggests that they might have been a necessary precondition for a state of non-domination to prevail in Finland.

As regards democratic control, it seems clear that neither Parliament nor the President knew exactly what was going on in Finnish military intelligence and military planning during the Cold War. To some extent the Cold War situation reflected the realities at the time of both World Wars, when Mannerheim and his associates made grand strategy fairly independently. It is easy to condemn the lack of openness in Finnish strategic culture, but doing so raises questions about what would have been the alternative. Had Finland behaved in a fully 'Nordic' manner and followed the imperatives of the Nordic balance theory, the country would essentially have been left to the Soviet sphere of influence. Could a state whose citizens' freedom would have been dependent on the good will of one of the most murderous empires in world history, really have been called a free country in the republican sense of the word?

Regarding the use of force, Mannerheim's grand strategy in both World Wars was to see military force as a tool of signalling, and when the signal to be sent was one of resolve in defending the Republic, it was sent, as hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers learned the hard way. Un-Nordic, maybe, but when nearby Estonia tried the more peaceful approach, it ended up with half a century of Soviet occupation.

Including Finland as one variation in the theme of Nordic strategic cultures suggests that we might want to rethink what we mean by Nordic political and strategic culture. In a similar sense as intellectuals agonize over the question of whether America may be said to be the truth about Europe, political theorists might want to contemplate whether Finland, at least in the realm of strategic culture, could be 'the truth about Scandinavia'. Could it be that in fighting so hard for their historic right to belong to the Nordic group of nations Finns have realized what being Nordic is all about — not linguistic ties, ethnic kinship, a common love of social harmony or isolationist foreign policy, but a stubborn commitment to the principle of non-domination, even when it has come with a high price tag?⁴⁸

If it is true that in terms of strategic culture Finland is 'the truth about Scandinavia', then inside every Scandinavian there is a Finn struggling to get out. That would mean that understanding Finnish strategic culture might be a prerequisite for Scandinavian self-understanding, especially in times of epochal change as we are now experiencing. As the varying degrees of isolationism in the Nordic region begin to mould into a more clearly European form, Scandinavians might want to study more closely the case of Finnish strategic culture in order to understand what is happening to them.

Notes

1. In this article, I focus mainly on the last of these three components, since many researchers, including myself, have dealt elsewhere with the first two in more detail and because the last component has the closest relation to the strategic practices outlined in the introductory article. On Finland's role in the shaping of the CFSP, see the summaries of the 18 volumes on the 'Northern Dimension of the CFSP' in Heikka (2003b).

2. The 1995 report is available at: <http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/tpsehg4.html#menu%20>; the 1997 report at: <http://www.eduskunta.fi/triphome/bin/utaveps.scr?{KEY}=vns+1/1997>; and the 2001 report at: http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/lang/3/topmenu_id/7/menu_id/13/fs/12; and the 2004 report at: http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2160_English_White_paper_2004.pdf. By 'most authoritative' I mean the role of the reports as the highest guiding administrative documents on the topic.

3. While the number of wartime reservists has gone down from approximately 700,000 to 500,000 and is set to decrease to 350,000 in the near future, the necessity of conscription remained almost unquestioned in the Finnish debate. For a dissenting view, arguing for a network-centric defence with more flexibility in

defence planning through NATO membership and active participation in European defence, see Heikka (2004a).

4. NATO membership would, in theory, bring flexibility to defence planning. Deepening NATO integration was reflected in Finnish participation in PfP from 1994 onwards and the closely related Planning and Review Process from 1995 onwards. After the second round of PARP in 2001, Finland achieved what in NATO's terminology is referred to as 'interoperability' (the first level being 'compatibility', the next layers 'interchangeability' and 'commonality'). Only a few alliance members have reached levels higher than interoperability (Olin, 1996).

5. During the 1990s, the Finnish defence forces spent about 30 per cent of their budget on procurement. The level of procurement is relatively high by international standards and is explained by the low costs of conscripts, the modest salaries of the officers and the general streamlining of expenditure that has taken place in the Defence Forces during the past decade. On procurement in more detail, see Heikka (2003a: 64–72).

6. Iskukykytutkimuksen tulokset (Helsinki: Pääesikunnan tiedote 4.3.2004). Available in Finnish at: <http://www.mil.fi/asiointi/tiedotus/tiedotteet/liitteet/ikt.pdf>.

7. See Hopkinson (2004) and Heikka (2004b).

8. These include information network security (primarily driven by the encryption technology cluster); network solutions for crisis management forces and security of critical networks (both driven by the telecoms and ICT cluster); and threat detection and tracking technology (driven by the measurement technology sector).

9. On the future requirements of European Defence, see Research for a Secure Europe: Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004).

10. Barry Posen has described the realist logic at work when states 'read' the distribution of capabilities in the international system and realize that it does not protect them from external threats, which in turn leads them to form balances against power. Regarding strategic practices, balance of power theory, according to Posen, predicts 'heterogeneity in military doctrine, dependent on reasonable appraisals by each state of its political, technological, economic, and geographical problems and possibilities in the international political system' (Posen, 1984: 34–7, 59).

11. Republican security theory is less an explicit theory than a five-centuries old European diplomatic discourse that forms the background for two distinct strands of IR theory, realism and liberalism (see Deudney, 1996, 2000, forthcoming; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1993/94). Kupchan (2002) can be seen as an important contribution to republican security discourse. Among IR classics, Reinhold Niebuhr's works echo some of the central themes of republican security theory, such as the need to create institutions that uphold a state of non-domination in a world populated by sinful human beings (see Niebuhr, 1996/1943, 1977).

12. While the focus here is on republican security theory, the argument implies that defence of a republican security order in Northern Europe has been a precondition for republican governance within the countries of the region. In domestic politics, republicanism implies the existence of strong laws and institutions that create checks and balances that prevent individuals and interest groups from dominating others, as well as the cultivation of civic virtue, which holds a society composed of individual wills together, making possible collective goods. On republicanism and its history, see Honohan (2002), Bock, Skinner and Viroli (1990) and Viroli (2002). Classical works include Machiavelli (1977), Harrington (1992) and Hamilton, Madison and Jay (1961).

13. Here my view differs from that of the Copenhagen School, which emphasizes the existence of regional security complexes (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Buzan, 2004). The argument presented in this article suggests that the English School's classical approach of focusing on the system level and the society level might still be relevant.

14. An alternative perspective is Browning (2003), who shows how labels such as liberal and Fennoman can be used creatively to construct a narrative that makes sense in its own right.

15. See Heikka (2003a: 6–14). Russian grand strategy, driven by Ivan III's revolutionary vision of Moscow as the Third Rome and based on strategic practices inherited from the Mongols, was clearly revisionist.

16. Augsburg essentially ended the Valois–Habsburg struggle for mastery in Europe, institutionalizing Europe's first constitutional order among princely states according to the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, enthusiastically supported by protestants in the North. In the Finnish case, a key figure bringing Protestantism into the country was Mikael Agricola (1510–57), who studied under Luther and Melancthon in Germany and made their originally radical views the mainstream in Finnish politics. Besides being an academic and bishop, Agricola also served in the Finnish delegation to Moscow that negotiated a peaceful end to the 1555–57 war.

17. See Roberts (1967). While there is discussion about the extent to which the military revolution at the time was a specifically Swedish–Finnish phenomenon, or whether the crucial innovations took place in other armed forces, such as the Spanish or the Dutch ones, the strategic importance of the Swedish–Finnish RMA seems generally accepted (Ayton and Price, 1998; Murray and Knox, 2001). One might argue that when the military revolution is seen in the context of society-wide administrative and cultural reforms, the Swedish–Finnish reforms stand out as more comprehensive and novel than the Dutch or Spanish reforms.

18. The former was characterized by the struggle between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, on the one side, and France and the Ottomans, on the other. This struggle, fought primarily in Italy, Germany and the Mediterranean, lasted from the French invasion of Italy in 1494 to the Utrecht peace settlement of 1714. The latter system, centred around the Baltic Sea, comprised Sweden–Finland as the hegemonic actor and Poland–Lithuania as the other major power, with Muscovy as a rising challenger and the Ottoman empire in the south as key threat to the rise of Muscovy. Yet Muscovy and the Ottoman Sultanate, though part of the North-Eastern system of states in the strategic sense, remained outside the European international society that emerged from Latin Christendom, Muscovy being considered a Byzantine-tartar state and the Ottomans being regarded as a non-European power due to Islamic religion. On this topic, see Watson (1984: 63–5).

19. On Grotius and Sweden–Finland, see Roelofsen (1990: 127–31). Martin Wight has attributed the term 'systems of states' to Pufendorf (1977: 21), and key constructivist works have made reference to his work (Kratochwil, 1989: 138–54; Onuf, 1998). On the recent revival of Pufendorf, see David Boucher (2001).

20. Although in fairness it should be said that the rapidly shifting alliance patterns in the eighteenth century rendered the management of alliance portfolios a challenging task. For example, the run-up to the Great Northern War saw the emergence of a balanced coalition, with Peter the Great constructing a strategic alliance with Fredrick IV of Denmark and Augustus of Saxony balancing with Sweden–Finland, all three united in their desire to seek territorial gains from the regional hegemon.

21. The prerequisite for both of these was the liberalization of Swedish–Finnish political culture during the so-called 'Age of Liberty', which lasted roughly from

1719 to 1772. The weakness of the Swedish–Finnish system was that it transferred the making of security policy from professional bureaucrats and officers to the hands of political parties. This was particularly dangerous at a time when Sweden–Finland was militarily and economically weak, making domestic party politics an easy target for foreign intervention, although to some extent Russia's heavy influence in Swedish domestic policy at the time was a result of the lost war in the 1740s. Likewise, Russia's ability to influence policy-making in Sweden decreased after 1790 not just because of changes in the Swedish domestic situation but because of the war in 1788–90, in which the Swedish–Finnish navy defeated Russia's Baltic fleet, thus limiting Russia's power projection capabilities.

22. On Horn, see e.g. Karonen (2001: 384–90). Russia's grand strategic goal at the time was the creation of a Northern System or Northern Accord, nominally coordinating the policies of Northern European countries in order to balance the powers on the continent, but in reality subjection of Sweden–Finland, Poland and Saxony under Russian domination. The plan, drawn up by Nikita Panin, Russia's former ambassador to Sweden–Finland and an influential figure in shaping Russian grand strategy at the time, divided the powers of Northern Europe into two, the 'active' powers and the 'passive' powers. The active powers, Denmark and Prussia, were assumed to be Russia's close allies, whereas the passive powers, Sweden–Finland, Poland and Saxony, consisted of the enemies of the active powers (Poland and Saxony were enemies of Prussia because Prussia had an interest in acquiring territories from them, Sweden–Finland an enemy of Denmark because the Danes had an interest in limiting Stockholm's military and economic influence in the Baltic Sea region). See e.g. LeDonne (1997: 39–41). While Denmark displayed eagerness in balancing Sweden–Finland's power together with Russia, Prussia never subscribed to Panin's plans and thus strengthened the hand of Sweden–Finland.

23. Horn never had the chance to put his grand strategy into practice, and as the domestic balance of power tipped in the hats' favour during the period 1738–39, leading to preparations for offensive war, he resigned. Later examples of Finnish policies reflecting a similar concern of Russia's place in Europe were the policy of separatist loyalism in the nineteenth century, Mannerheim's idea of liberating Russia from the Bolsheviks after the revolution, Paasikivi and Kekkonen's attempts to safeguard Finnish neutrality and maintain peaceful relations with Moscow during the Cold War, Finnish diplomacy leading to the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act, and finally Finland's role in launching and shaping the EU's Northern Dimension policy in the late 1990s. All of these sought to increase Finnish security by socializing Russia within international society.

24. On the enduring relevance of Chydenius in a partially globalized world, see Heikka (2004b).

25. The main structural factors behind the disaster were strikingly similar to those a century earlier: Sweden–Finland proved too small to resist Russian expansionism, Britain acted as the balancer to save Swedish heartland from Russia, while Finland was left to resist Russia alone. As was the case a century earlier, Finnish resistance sent a powerful signal to St. Petersburg and won the country crucial concessions from the Russians. Changes in the overall European balance of power meant that, unlike a century earlier, France and Britain were unable and unwilling to provide the required military backing for Sweden–Finland to remain intact.

26. When reflecting on the causes of the disaster from the perspective of strategic culture, two factors stand out, both relevant to the question of civil–military relations. First, the Swedish–Finnish military tenure system, where farmers assumed direct responsibility for maintaining professional soldiers, was probably not an optimal system in terms of military effectiveness at the time. Containing Russia at the

time would have required a larger number of soldiers, who in turn would have to have been better trained than was the case for the tenure army. In this sense, a cultural lag from the Age of Greatness hindered adaptation to the ongoing RMA, which other countries, such as Napoleonic France, had used to advantage. Second, the small scale of the Swedish military effort in reinforcing the Finnish military showed that defending Finland did not rank high in Stockholm's grand strategy. This, in turn, reflected three weaknesses in Stockholm's grand strategy. First was Sweden's disorientation regarding the geographic direction of the likely long-term threats to the Kingdom's security, arguably a cultural lag from the Age of Greatness, during which the Kingdom's grand strategy was oriented in all azimuths. A second, closely related factor was the continuing inability of Stockholm and Copenhagen to work together to ensure the maintenance of a balance of power in the Nordic region. Third was the inadequate participation of Finns in the making of Swedish-Finnish grand strategy, which accentuated the other two problems and left the country alone in dealing with Russia.

27. Jussila, Hentilä and Nevakivi (1995: 38–9).

28. In terms of strategic culture, the evolution in Russia can be described as a gradual move from the arch-realist policies of the early nineteenth century into the revisionist 'cult of the offensive' of the early twentieth century.

29. In the shadow of the increasing centralization of the Russian empire, the Finnish government's strategic practices were aimed at defending the realm of the rule of law by isolating the Russian Governor-General from the civil administration of Finland. Step by step the Finnish elite was able to consolidate the role of the Senate, to create and strengthen the role of a Supreme Court and to limit the Governor-General's duties. The essence of the policy from the Finnish side was to reassure St. Petersburg that liberal reforms and autonomy were in the interests of Russia, since introducing administrative reforms of the kind introduced in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States at the time (e.g. the systems of local government introduced elsewhere) would backfire in Finland and lead to political unrest. On the game between Finnish authorities and Russian bureaucrats, see Jussila, Hentilä and Nevakivi (1995: 38–9).

30. Finland's merchant fleet at the time was larger than the Russian merchant fleet, and because the fleet could not sail under the Finnish flag, it risked being a target of military operations aimed at Russian ships. Finnish ship-owners were in fact the first (in 1859) to make an official request to the Finnish merchant fleet to declare the country neutral, a request which they also submitted to the Russian authorities (Penttilä, 1992: 19–23).

31. See Jussila, Hentilä and Nevakivi (1995: 82–3). The first conflict between the Civil Guards, composed primarily of students, and 'red guards', composed mostly of workers, occurred in 1906 in Helsinki. When looking for continuities in Finnish military culture, the early civil guard formations from 1905 onward, which a decade later developed into the Jäger movement, can be seen as the link between the armed forces of the Finnish Grand Duchy that existed from 1809 to 1904, and the post-1917 Finnish defence forces. See Kronlund (1988: 23–31).

32. German troops did land in 1918 on three Russian-occupied locations in Southern Finland and thus helped the Finnish war effort, but the main, strategically relevant, battles of the war took place between the Finnish government's troops and the Red Guards.

33. On the period between World War I and the end of the Cold War as a long war in which parliamentary democracy defeated fascism and communism, see Bobbitt (2003: 21–64).

34. On external and internal balancing, see Waltz (1979: 168).

35. On the Western, primarily British, influence on Finnish strategic practices at the time, see Kronlund (1988: 286–9) and Selén (1980: 31–4).

36. Recent research has shed light on the American option. The Finnish government sent a military attaché to Washington in April 1939 with the mission of explaining Finnish concerns to the US leadership and of reassuring them of Finnish neutrality. In addition, his goal was to inquire about possible loans for military purchases from the US. The loan and the purchases, which in hindsight might have been decisive in strengthening Finland's ability to defend her neutrality alone in the later stages of the war, were refused. British lobbying played an important, probably decisive, role in the decision. From London's perspective, anything that weakened Germany had to be preferred, even if it meant denying aid to a small democracy under pressure from the Soviet Union (see Nevakivi, 2000).

37. Finnish strategic culture at the time was also reflected in the first textbook on IR and strategic studies written in Finnish by Yrjö Ruutu in the mid-1930s. A Jäger movement activist who was later to become an influential left-wing social democrat and the first Finnish political science professor to specialize in international relations, Ruutu developed his thinking in relation to Rudolf Kjellen's ideas on geopolitics. Besides geopolitics, Ruutu's thinking included a strong commitment to international law and the virtues of neutrality, which he developed in detail in relation to concepts such as balance of power, security guarantees, international institutions and arms control. Ruutu emphasized the importance of IR as an independent academic discipline that should not shy away from dealing with 'sensitive issues', political and strategic questions that international law alone could not answer (see Ruutu, 1934). On Ruutu's life and influence, see Soikkanen (1991).

38. Mannerheim outlined his argument for Nordic cooperation in more detail in a presentation to 30 newspaper editors in June 1935. According to Mannerheim, economic and military aid from the West would be vital for Finland if the country was attacked by the Soviet Union. Mannerheim believed that British and French aid was out of the question. He claimed that Britain would stick to its traditional policy of not committing itself to anything related to Finland, and France could not be counted upon because of its entente with the Soviets. Mannerheim noted that while Germany was an openly anti-Soviet country and therefore a potential ally of Finland, it was unacceptable and unreliable because of its Nazi leadership. Poland and the Baltic states were categorically rejected by Mannerheim as too weak to make a meaningful difference to the balancing effort. Mannerheim also argued that the Baltic Sea would not be a safe route for transporting goods to Finland, which left the Scandinavian peninsula as the only supply route to Finland in a crisis involving Russia. For a summary of Mannerheim's presentation, and its impact on Finnish grand strategy, see Selén (1980: 248–52).

39. See Mannerheim (1952: 60). Besides Mannerheim, Chairman of the Defence Council, the key politicians in Finland pushing forward the policy of Nordic military cooperation were President Svinhufvud, Prime Minister Kivimäki, Foreign Minister Hackzell and Chairman of the Conservative Party Paasikivi. The social democrats in Finland, especially Väinö Tanner, were also active in pursuing cooperation with their Swedish counterparts, even though Tanner's analysis of the Soviet military threat and the adequate level of defence expenditure was different from that of the conservatives.

40. Finland did receive small amounts of aid from Britain and France; in total a couple of dozen pieces of heavy artillery and air defence guns, 30 French Morane Saulnier fighters and 8 British Hurricanes which arrived too late to engage in combat. By comparison, the Red Army's deployment along the Finnish border included

about 2000 pieces of artillery and 480 fighter planes and 240 bombers. Interestingly, the extremely poor performance of the Red Army led the British War Cabinet to ponder in January 1940 whether too much help to the Finns would lead them to defeat the Soviets — which could tip the whole balance of power between Germany and the Soviet Union. On the discussion, see Nevakivi (2000: 147–8).

41. The most thorough and up-to-date study of Finland's relationship with Germany during the war is that of Joki-Sipilä (2004). According to Joki-Sipilä, the 1944 treaty between President Ryti and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in which Finland, for the first time, seems to have conceded the existence of coordination between Finnish and German war aims, was unnecessary from the perspective of Finnish defence requirements at the time. Joki-Sipilä argues — quite convincingly — that Mannerheim supported the treaty in order to ensure a maximum number of German military supplies, which Mannerheim believed would be necessary for Finland's survival once Germany had been defeated and Finland would have had to survive alone next to Stalin's empire.

42. See Tynkkynen (1996). The academic background for Finnish grand strategy at the time was influenced by the work of Kullervo Killinen, a former naval officer and long-time Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki, who wrote textbooks where Finnish grand strategy was based explicitly on republican political theory and embedded in an interpretation of the evolution of European international society from Westphalia onwards. Killinen regarded 'communist totalitarianism' as an aversion to this evolution, and predicted the eventual emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet dominance (1964, 1967a, b).

43. A small but noisy opposition to this policy appeared within the left-wing ranks of the social democratic party. The group included prominent young social democrat politicians such as Erkki Tuomioja, Kalevi Sorsa, Tarja Halonen and — for a while, Paavo Lipponen — as well as scholars such as Osmo Apunen, Jaakko Kalela and Pertti Joenniemi. According to this group, Finnish security rested not on neutrality and a credible defence capability, but on maintaining good relations with the Soviets, which according to the group required small defence budgets. A counterweight group that formed within the foreign ministry included prominent diplomats such as Max Jakobson, Risto Hyvärinen, Ikka Pastinen and Björn Alholm (Tarkka, 2002: 59–60). The steady increase in Finnish military budgets suggests that the latter group's grand strategic ideas prevailed over the left-wing opposition.

44. The evolving focus on IR as a topic of study at the time in Finland can be seen by comparing Killinen's works on grand strategy in the 1960s to the 1977 textbook by Kalevi Ruhala. Ruhala's *Turvallisuuspolitiikka* is a mainstream Cold War era security studies textbook with an emphasis on the policy of neutrality and the nuclear dimension of strategy, arms control and conflict prevention. It can be seen as an attempt to seize the mainstream in the wake of the proliferation of peace research in Finland. Ruhala's treatment of the concept of security begins with the individual and his/her political rights, and builds upon the idea of these rights as the source of legitimacy for defence policy (Ruhala, 1977: 20–9).

45. On Finlandization, see Mouritzen (1988). Mouritzen's study includes only five pages on the actual case study on Finnish security policy and is focused on searching for signs of 'Finlandization' in the Danish and Swedish cases.

46. The explanation for the late start seems to lie in operation Stella Polaris at the end of World War II, when Finnish military archives and some key personnel were transferred to Sweden before ending up in, among other places, the US. As a result, Finnish military intelligence had to be rebuilt from scratch in the 1950s. On Stella Polaris, see Manninen and Liene (2002). On the history of the Finnish stay-behind network, see Lukkari (1992).

47. There is a lack of publicly available archival evidence on the topic, and some of the information has surfaced only recently, with retired commanders and military intelligence officers relating their activities. Useful sources on the game played by the Finnish military include Lukkari (2003) and H. Tiilikainen (2003). A documentary on Finland's military cooperation with the US during the Cold War, based on interviews and available archival sources, is 'Suomen salainen sotilastie länteen' (Finland's secret military road to the West) by Olli Ainola and Ari Lehtikainen, first broadcast on YLE TV1 on 25.4.2004.

48. Such a definition would also make it easier to incorporate the Baltic states within the Nordic–Baltic group of nations. The Baltic states' determined struggle to regain their independence and join NATO — despite reservations about some of the states in their neighbourhood — seems to reflect the virtuous spirit that the Finnish version of Nordic strategic culture has, in its finest hours, been all about.

References

- Ayton, Andrew and Price, J. L. (1998) 'Introduction: The Military Revolution from a Medieval Perspective', in Andrew Ayton and J. L. Price (eds) *The Medieval Military Revolution*, pp. 1–22. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Bobbitt, Philip (2003) *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*. London: Penguin Books.
- Bock, Gisela, Skinner, Quentin and Viroli, Maurizio (eds) (1990) *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boucher, David (2001) 'Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment', *Review of International Studies* 27: 557–77.
- Browning, Christopher (2003) *Constructing Finnish National Identity and Foreign Policy, 1809–2000*. PhD manuscript, University of Wales.
- Brundtland, Arne Olav (1966) 'The Nordic Balance: Past and Present', *Cooperation and Conflict* 1: 30–66.
- Buzan, Barry (2004) *From International to World Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole (2003) *Regions & Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chydenius, Anders (1765) *The National Gain*. Available at: http://www.chydenius.net/historia/teokset/e_kansallinen_koko.asp.
- Deudney, Daniel (1996) 'Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and the Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, pp. 190–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deudney, Daniel (2000) 'Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and the Changing Material Contexts', *Security Studies* 10: 1–42.
- Deudney, Daniel (forthcoming) *Binding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Daniel Deudney and Ikenberry, G. John (1993/94) 'The Logic of the West', *World Policy Journal* 10: 17–25.
- Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James and Jay, J. (ed. by C. Rossiter) (1961) *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Mentor Press.
- Harrington, James (1992) *The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heikka, Henrikki (2003a) 'Maintaining a Balance of Power that Favors Human Freedom', UPI Working Papers 39. Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

- Heikka, Henrikki (2003b) *Grand Strategies and the Northern Dimension of European Security: Four Scenarios for 2010*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- Heikka, Henrikki (2004a) 'From Containment to N-Gagement, Atlanticism in a Network-Centric World', *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, pp. 107–20.
- Heikka, Henrikki (2004b) 'Kokkolan kirkkoherra parantaa terroristit', *Kosmopolis* 34: 63–8.
- Honohan, Iseult (2002) *Civic Republicanism*. London: Routledge.
- Hopkinson, William (2004) *Sizing and Shaping European Armed Forces: Lessons and Considerations from the Nordic Countries*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 7. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Joki-Sipilä, Markku (2004) *Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia?* Helsinki: SKS.
- Jussila, Osmo, Hentilä, Seppo and Nevakivi, Jukka (1995) *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A Political History of Finland Since 1809*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Karonen, Petri (2001) *Pohjoinen Suurvalta: Ruotsi ja Suomi 1521–1809*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Keene, Edward (2002) *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Killinen, Kullervo (1964) *Kansainvälinen politiikka I*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Killinen, Kullervo (1967a) *Kansainvälinen politiikka II*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Killinen, Kullervo (1967b) *Kansallinen etu ja kansainvälinen kehitys*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (1989) *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kronlund, Jarl (1988) *Suomen Puolustuslaitos 1918–1939*. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Kupchan, Charles A. (2002) *The End of the American Era*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- LeDonne, John (1997) *The Russian Empire and the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lukkari, Matti (1992) *Asekätkentä*. Keuruu: Otava.
- Lukkari, Matti (2003) *Lauri Sutela: Puolustusvoiman Komentaja*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1977) *The Prince*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Mannerheim, Gustav (1952) *Muistelmat: Toinen Osa*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Manninen, Ohto and Liene, Timo, eds (2002) *Stella Polaris: Suomalaista sotilastiedustelua*. Helsinki: Edita.
- Mouritzen, Hans (1988) *Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Murray, Williamson and Knox, MacGregor (2001) 'Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare', in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–1550*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.
- Nevakivi, Jukka (2000) *Apu jota ei annettu: Länsivallat ja Suomen talvisota*. Juva: W. S. Bookwell.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold (1977) *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold (1996/1943) *The Nature and Destiny of Man: Vol. II: Human Destiny*. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press.
- Olin, Pentti (1996) *Naton rauhankumppanuusohjelma ja Suomi*. Helsinki: Pääesikunnan kansainvälisen osaston julkaisuja 3/1996.
- Onuf, Nicholas (1998) *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Penttilä, Risto (1991) *Finland's Search for Security Through Defence, 1944–89*. London: Macmillan.
- Penttilä, Risto (1992) *Moskovasta Brysseliin*. Helsinki: Edita.
- Penttilä, Risto (1994) *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective*. Helsinki: National Defence College.
- Posen, Barry (1984) *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ries Tomas (1988) *Cold Will: The Defense of Finland*. London: Brassey's.
- Ries, Tomas (1990) *Luja tahto: Suomen puolustaminen*. Helsinki: Suomen Mies.
- Roberts, Michael (1967) *Essays in Swedish History*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Roelofsen, C. G. (1990) 'Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century', in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds) *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, pp. 95–131. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ruhala, Kalevi (1977) *Turvallisuuspolitiikka*. Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti.
- Ruutu, Yrjö (1934) *Nykyajan kansainvälinen politiikka*. Jyväskylä: Gummerus.
- Screen, J. E. O. (1970) *Mannerheim: The Years of Preparation*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Selén, Kari (1980) *C. G. E. Mannerheim ja hänen puolustusneuvostonsa 1931–1939*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Soikkanen, Timo (1991) *Yrjö Ruutu, Näkijä ja tekijä*. Helsinki, WSOY.
- Tarkka, Jukka (2002) *Uhan alta Unioniin: Asennemurros ja sen unilukkari EVA*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Tiilikainen, Heikki (2003) *Kylmän sodan kujanjuoksu*. Helsinki: Ajatus.
- Tiilikainen, Teija (1998) *Europe and Finland: Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Tiilikainen, Teija (2003) 'The Finnish Presidency of 1999: Pragmatism and the Promotion of Finland's Position in Europe', in Ole Elgström (ed.) *European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Tynkkynen, Vesa (1996) *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: Taktiikan kehittymisen ensi vuosikymmenet Suomessa*. Julkaisusarja 1, 1/1996, Finnish National Defense College.
- Viroli, Maurizio (2002) *Republicanism*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Visuri, Pekka (1989) *Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan: puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys läntisessä Keski-Euroopassa ja Suomessa vuosina 1945–1985*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Visuri, Pekka (1990) *The Evolution of Finnish Military Doctrine 1945–1985*. Helsinki: National Defence College.
- Visuri, Pekka (1997) *Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Watson, Adam (1984) 'Russia and the European States System', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds) *The Expansion of International Society*, pp. 61–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wight, Martin (1977) *Systems of States*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Wight, Martin (1991) *International Theory: the Three Traditions*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

HENRIKKI HEIKKA is Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs presently finishing a doctoral thesis dealing with Finnish strategic culture and European security. His most recent

research report is 'Grand Strategies and the Northern Dimension of European Security: Four Scenarios for 2010' (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003).

Address: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Mannerheimintie 15A, FIN-00260 Helsinki, Finland.

[email: henrikki.heikka@upi-fia.fi]